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Globally, the use of economic instruments for biodiversity conservation has 
gained a lot of support. This is because of the concern for the economic well being 
of people living in and near biodiversity-rich areas. Also, economic drivers are the 
main threats to biodiversity. This policy of using economic instruments is being 
used on a case-by-case basis worldwide.  A review of their use from a global 
perspective is important to facilitate learning from issues resulting from their 
implementation. This article documents and reviews the specific economic 
instruments being used in different parts of the world for biodiversity conservation. 
An analysis of the economic instruments using a demand or supply classification 
suggests that more instruments are targeted at increasing supply of biological 
resources for human use. A review of literature and field documents was also 
employed to determine trends in the use of economic instruments for conservation. 
A major trend observed is the relatively low investments in economic instruments 
used for biodiversity conservation in developing countries, even though such 
countries tend to be rich in biodiversity. 
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Biological diversity (or biodiversity) is the basic support for life on earth. 
Therefore, its importance to the survival of humans and their needs and wants 
cannot be overemphasized. However, global biodiversity is declining, thereby 
threatening the future survival of humanity. Without ambitious policies, biodiversity 
is projected to decline by a further 10% globally by 2050 (Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 2012).  
This decline of biodiversity and the biological resources they provide 
worldwide has been of increasing concern such that many tools and strategies are 
being used to address the threats (Groom et al. 2006). Among these strategies are 
economic instruments, such as policies, strategies and activities. These economic 
instruments are used to influence how people conduct their economic activities in 
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order to reduce the rate of biodiversity loss in various parts of the world. Some 
examples include market-oriented tools such as fees and ecotourism, and financial 
incentives such as compensations and tax incentives. In developing countries, 
development interventions such as alternative livelihood programs near protected 
areas are also implemented. Investments in local economic livelihood activities are 
therefore used to influence how people’s actions affect biodiversity. It is important 
to determine whether and how effective all these different economic instruments are 
for biodiversity conservation. However, since they are employed on a case-by-case 
basis, information on them is scattered in several books and papers.  A global 
perspective that documents their use and lessons from their successes and failures is 
necessary. 
This study aims at presenting a consolidated global perspective of 
experiences of the use of economic tools for biodiversity conservation. The 
objectives of the study are to determine and describe the following: 
 The role of economics in biodiversity conservation. 
 The economic instruments being used for biodiversity conservation and the 
justification for their use. 
 Some global trends and results from the use of economic instruments for 
biodiversity conservation. 
 
2. Biodiversity and Economics 
 
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) defines biodiversity as the 
variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, 
marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are 
part; this includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems (CBD, 
2008). By this definition, biodiversity is the “variability among” instead of the “full 
extent or scale” (Bennet, 2003) of all living organisms at various organizational levels 
including genetic, species and ecosystem levels, and the functions that maintain the 
biological organisms and their habitats. Biodiversity therefore captures two 
dimensions: number of biological organisms and their variability (Perman et al. 
2003). This technical definition makes biodiversity a very complex concept and its 
absolute empirical assessment or measurement cumbersome. However, since scale 
and variability are linked, it is often understood in terms of the wide variety of plants, 
animals and microorganisms. For many reasons, the most common unit of 
measurement is in terms of the number and diversity of species. Estimates range 
from 3 to 100 million species but an estimate by Dobson (1996) claims 6 million is 
more realistic.  
In economics, biodiversity is usually valued in terms of the biological 
resources that are generated from it. It is therefore perceived in terms of biological 
resources that humans use directly and indirectly and also perceived to be important 
for maintaining the environment in which they live. These biological resources 
include genetic resources, organisms and/or their parts, populations, or any other 
biotic component of ecosystems with actual or potential use or value for humanity. 
Therefore, though economics is also concerned about biodiversity conservation, it 
acknowledges that individuals and/or organizations do not decide directly upon how 
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much diversity to preserve, but rather make decisions about the way in which 
biological resources and their habitat are used (van Kooten and Bulte, 2000). The 
overriding goal of economics is to deliver choice solutions that make society better 
off. Therefore, economists view biodiversity as a scarce and valuable resource which 
humans use to improve their well-being through both present and future potential 
values. This makes biodiversity anthropocentric and utilitarian from an economic 
point of view. It has the peculiar attribute of a renewable resource which “grows” 
even when it is used for the different values humans place on it. 
Biodiversity has many values of importance to humans. Groom et al. (2006) 
classify them into instrumental and intrinsic values. The instrumental values include 
their use as goods such as food, fuel, fiber and medicine; for ecosystem services such 
as nutrient recycling, air and water purification, climate regulation, and the generation 
of moisture and oxygen; information values such as genetic storehouse for 
biotechnology, genetic engineering and other life sciences research; and psycho-
spiritual uses such as aesthetic beauty, religious awe and cultural identity (Ibid.). The 
intrinsic value, as seen in terms of its existence, means it is important and that 
satisfies some humans.  Apart from the values outlined above, biodiversity also has 
future potential uses, which may be difficult to foresee. All these values can be 
assigned economic values, but with limitations. Many attempts to put dollar values 
on the present and future potential values of biodiversity have been inadequate but 
still resulted in values which are many times the world’s total Gross National 
Product, which humans cannot afford to substitute. From the different values that 
humans generate from biodiversity, it can be said that we need it for both our 
economic survival and existence. 
 
2.1 Threats to Biodiversity and Approaches to Biodiversity 
Conservation 
 
Both biodiversity and sustainable development are currently threatened by 
human action. Direct threats include habitat degradation and loss, habitat 
fragmentation, overexploitation or resources, species invasion and climate change 
(Groom et al, 2006). High losses driven by land-use change and management (e.g. 
for pasture, food crops and bioenergy crops), commercial forestry, infrastructure 
development, habitat encroachment and fragmentation, pollution (e.g. nitrogen 
deposition) and climate change are projected in parts of Asia, Europe and Southern 
Africa (OECD, 2012). 
Habitat degradation and loss (as well as fragmentation) are largely caused by 
conversion, modification, and fragmentation of natural ecosystems for alternative 
uses such as agriculture and infrastructural development, which do not maintain 
species diversity or which undermine the provision of vital ecological services. These 
changes in land use are often driven by the perception that employing land for 
alternative use would generate higher economic returns (Norton-Griffiths and 
Southey, 1995). Land use changes often result in irreversible changes to the habitat 
whose natural systems and component species are destroyed and replaced (Ehrlich 
and Kremen, 2001). Overexploitation is largely due to the increasing demand for 
natural resources because of increasing human population.  Due to human migration 
and other factors, several species are introduced in new areas where they invade and 
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dominate native species. Climate change - which is being observed globally - is 
making the results of these threats worse. Scientific information now indicates that 
though climate change is a natural process, human consumption patterns contribute 
to its increase.  These threats are resulting in many more species becoming 
endangered. The 2008 update of The International Union for Conservation of 
Nature (IUCN) Red List includes 44,838 species, of which 869 (2%) are Extinct or 
Extinct the Wild; 16,928 (38%) are threatened with extinction (with 3,246 Critically 
Endangered, 4,770 Endangered and 8,912 Vulnerable); 3,513 (8%) are Near 
Threatened; while 5,570 (12%) have insufficient information to determine their 
threat status (Data Deficient). The number of extinctions might well exceed 1,100 if 
the 257 Critically Endangered species tagged as ‘Possibly Extinct’ are considered 
(IUCN 2008a). A review of the trends in the numbers of endangered species by Ayoo 
(2008) indicates an increasing number of endangered species. European Commission 
(2008) indicates that the current decline in biodiversity and the related loss of 
ecosystem services will continue and in some cases even accelerate – some 
ecosystems are likely to be damaged beyond repair. It estimates that if human 
development continues in a “business-as usual” scenario, 11% of natural areas in 
2000, 40% of the land currently under low-impact forms of agriculture and 60% of 
coral reefs could be lost by 2050. These studies indicate that human actions play a 
big role in the decline of biodiversity.  
As a result of these anthropogenic threats and the consequent biodiversity 
decline, different biodiversity conservation approaches are used. These include 
establishment of protected areas on public lands, educational programs, government 
acquisition of private lands, regulatory prohibitions and requirements and economic 
instruments. These strategies are largely used complementarily. The major direct 
threats to biodiversity loss outlined above are to a large extent driven by economic 
factors.   
 
2.2 Underlying Economic Causes of Biodiversity Decline 
  
The major direct threats to biodiversity loss outlined above are to a large 
extent driven by economic factors because of the close links that exist between 
economic policies and the actions of humans as economic agents. Economic factors 
such as markets, policies and institutional arrangements tend to undervalue many 
goods and services associated with biological resources, ecosystems and their 
diversity and the premium attached to conserving them (Emerton, 2000).  This 
results in biodiversity being underpriced, over-consumed and under-conserved 
because it is treated as a free good, which can be mined, converted, depleted or 
otherwise degraded at no social cost. Therefore, activities that lead to biodiversity 
degradation are permitted or even encouraged to occur because of failures and 
distortions in policies and laws, markets, institutions and livelihoods (UNEP, 2004; 
Ayoo, 2008) that govern the use of biological resources. Swanson (1995) as cited by 
van Kooten and Bulte (2000) adds portfolio choice and development as other 
underlying causes of biodiversity decline. I argue that these are similar to the 
institutional and livelihood failures respectively of Ayoo (2008) because portfolio 
choice is usually influenced by institutional arrangements.  Also, development is 
largely concerned about different dimensions of human livelihoods.  
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Policy and legal failures occur when governments formulate and implement 
policies that are backed by legislations aimed at increasing economic activities. These 
could be in the form of agricultural subsidies or land re-distribution programs or 
increasing producer prices for certain crops. These may in turn encourage the use of 
more environmental amenities such as land and water for those activities and thus 
result in reduced biodiversity.  
In economics, markets allocate resources and so influence choice decisions 
about production and consumption of goods by economic agents. Economic 
activities therefore depend on markets and prices.  This is because markets determine 
the marginal profitability of different production options and the marginal economic 
desirability of different consumption options. However, markets are imperfect and 
can give wrong information about the value of renewable natural resources that are 
generated from biodiversity. Together, these phenomena result in the depletion of 
biodiversity because of increased land conversion.  
Institutional failures occur when organizations fail to coordinate their 
development in order to reduce its impact on biodiversity. Portfolio choice by these 
institutions occurs because biodiversity decline is an outcome of society’s own free 
will and this comes into play when developing countries copy the route taken by 
industrialized countries – the route of exploiting natural capital (van Kooten and 
Bulte, 2000). 
Livelihood failures occur when people are forced to engage in economic 
activities that degrade biodiversity. This occurs because people’s livelihoods, 
constraints and opportunities depend critically on biophysical and demographic 
conditions and local pressures that are, in turn, intricately linked to the nature of 
economic policies, markets and institutions (Ayoo 2008). Also in terms of human 
development, human societies and economies necessarily leave less room for other 
species, and possibly ecosystems (Swanson 1995 as cited by van Kooten and Bulte, 
2000).  
All the above underlying causes of biodiversity decline give a strong 
justification to the use of economic instruments such as fees and taxes for 
biodiversity conservation. This is because they provide a suite of tools for 
overcoming market, policy and institutional failures and for encouraging people to 
conserve biodiversity in the course of their economic activities (Emerton, 2000). 
These economic instruments can therefore be used improve the efficient allocation 
and use of natural and environmental resources so as to better reflect the social cost 
of using these resources (OECD, 2004). 
 
3. Economic Instruments for Biodiversity Conservation. 
 
Economic instruments are widely used in the health and education sectors to 
achieve development goals. For biodiversity conservation, economic instruments can 
be defined as mechanisms that aim at changing behaviors of economic agents by 
internalizing costs to natural resource utilization. Their use is predicated on the 
assumption that the social costs or benefits of biodiversity use, degradation, and 
restoration can be internalized in the price of activities that cause these losses or 
gains in biodiversity (OECD, 2004). This is because it is assumed that economic 
agents will use natural capital for activities that are most productive as per the 
Consilience Ekpe: Economic Instruments for Biodiversity Conservation 
Ricardian Rent Theory, which posits that the economic rent (price) for a fixed factor 
of production such as land will be higher for more productive lands. Natural capital 
usually has high discount rates, thereby making economic sense to convert them to 
reproducible capital now. Economic instruments are therefore aimed at lowering the 
discount rate so that the people who bear the immediate cost of conserving the 
resource can conserve for longer periods. This can be explained by understanding 
the underlying causes of biodiversity decline. 
Examples of these economic instruments include measures such as property 
rights, taxes, conservation easements, subsidies, charges, fees, market establishment, 
funds, loans, performance bonds, deposit systems, payment for ecosystem services, 
and livelihood support systems. They aim to change people’s behavior by making 
sure that they take into account the real value of biodiversity and the broad costs 
associated with its loss when they make decisions (Emerton, 2000). In many parts of 
the world they are used to supplement and not replace other conservation strategies 
such as existing regulations and land acquisition programs designed to conserve 
habitats and species (Defenders of Wildlife, 2006). 
The use of economic instruments for biodiversity conservation could be 
explained with the following example: A forest owner cuts the forest down for 
agriculture because that provides more marginal and immediate benefits. He or she 
does that without considering future costs such as watershed protection, source of 
medicine to him/her or to society. If future costs to the owner or society were 
considered or internalized, the owner could have kept the forest. Therefore, 
economic instruments should be aimed at making the forest owner appreciate and 
consider the future costs of cutting the forest now in his or her decision-making – 
internalization of future costs. If that makes the returns from of cutting the forest 
down now (including future costs of having no forest such as erosion, loss of 
potential medicine source, loss of habitat for pest-controlling species and loss of 
windbreak) lower than keeping the forest, the owner will decide to keep the forest. 
So the core aim of these instruments is to maintain optimal value of environmental 
goods and services for current and future generations. In low-income countries, 
development assistance in the form of livelihoods support programs is provided to 
communities living near biodiversity hotspots and other conservation areas. Some of 
these include development and promotion of ecotourism, beekeeping and wildlife 
domestication. Such interventions indirectly provide desirable services by redirecting 
labor and capital away from environmentally unsustainable activities, such as 
agricultural intensification that degrade ecosystems, and by encouraging commercial 
activities such as ecotourism that supply ecosystem services as joint products 
(Ferraro 2001).  
 
3.1 Classification of Economic Instruments for Biodiversity 
Conservation 
 
Several economic instruments are currently used for biodiversity 
conservation. To facilitate their understanding different organizations use different 
criteria for classification. The International Union of Conservation of Nature 
(IUCN) classifies them into market-based mechanisms and non market-based 
mechanism (IUCN, 2008b), while Defenders of Wildlife (2006) classifies them into 
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property rights innovations, market-oriented institutions, financial incentives and 
public tax incentives (Tables 1 and 2). 
 
Classified group Examples 
Market-based mechanisms  Markets for carbon sequestration  
 Markets for watershed services 
 Biodiversity offsets and mitigation 
 Conservation banking  
 Markets for recreation 
Non-market-based 
mechanisms 
 Global environment facility   
 Debt-for-nature swaps  
 Conservation trust funds or environmental 
funds  
 Taxes  
 Compensation to communities for 
opportunity cost and damages  
Table 1: IUCN classification of economic instruments for biodiversity conservation. 
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Classified group Examples 
Property rights innovations  Conservation easements 
 Covenants and deed restrictions 
 Stewardship exchange agreements 
Market-oriented institutions  User fees 
 Ecotourism 
 Eco-labeling and certification 
 Mitigation banking 
 Conservation banking 
 Transferable development rights 
 Ecosystem services markets 
Financial incentives  Compensation programs 
 Insurance 
 Cost-share incentives 
 Conservation stewardship incentives 
 Land and water rental leases 
 Conservation contracts 
 Debt forgiveness 
Public tax incentives  Income tax incentives 
 Property tax incentives 
 Estate tax incentives 
 Capital gains tax 
Table 2: Defenders of Wildlife classification of economic instruments for 
conservation. 
 
Examples in the Defenders of Wildlife classification are largely those 
economic instruments being used in the USA. As explained by IUCN (2008b), there 
has been increasing interest in market-based approaches to environmental 
conservation. The rationale is to create incentives for resource managers and/or 
owners to behave in ways that sustain environmental functions like carbon 
sequestration, watershed protection, and habitat for endangered species, maintenance 
of landscape beauty. The incentives can take the form of direct payments for 
ecosystem services or ecosystem markets, tradable permits or quotas, and eco-
labeling or certification schemes (Ibid.).  
Markets for carbon sequestration (IUCN, 2008b) stem from the growing 
evidence of global warming due to the greenhouse effect, and increasing credence to 
the threat of rising sea levels, loss of coral reefs, diseases, and desertification. This led 
to the development the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
in 1992 and the signing of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 to help reduce the build-up of 
greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide and methane.  The Kyoto Protocol set 
emission reduction targets for countries, providing a foundation for a system of 
emission rights trading – a carbon market. The rationale is that some countries will 
find it simpler and cheaper to reduce emissions than others, for instance through 
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carbon sequestration activities such as aforestation. They can therefore sell emission 
rights with those who will find it expensive to reduce emissions.  Funds from such 
sales would be used for aforestation and reforestation which sequester greenhouse 
gases and contribute to biodiversity conservation. Though big emitters such as the 
USA and China have not ratified the protocol, a voluntary market in carbon offsets 
has emerged and is likely to continue developing, both within and outside the 
framework of the protocol (IUCN, 2008). This market includes industries, project 
developers, consumers, several registries and even a trading exchange, the Chicago 
Climate Exchange (Bayon et al. 2006). 
Markets for watershed services stem from the growing recognition of the 
watershed services provided by forests. The increasing willingness of downstream 
populations to pay for these services has led to the emergence of payment 
mechanisms in parts of the world, from New York to Quito, and from Haryana to 
Costa Rica (IUCN, 2008b). Costa Rica’s pioneering environmental services program 
seeks to maintain socially optimal forest cover by compensating landowners for the 
external benefits provided by their forests (Chomitz et al., 1999). 
Biodiversity offsets and mitigation, as well as conservation banking refer to 
protected areas that are created and managed as a means of providing compensation 
for habitat loss resulting from land development. In this, developers buy credits from 
approved conservation bankers for each area of habitat that is destroyed. These 
funds are used to support species and habitat conservation efforts in the surrounding 
areas. Examples used in the USA are mitigation banking, conservation banking, and 
transferable development rights. 
Markets for recreation stem from the fact that alternative forms of tourism 
(ecotourism, green tourism, or nature tourism) are the fastest growing segments of 
the tourism sector, constituting about 30 percent of the global market today (IUCN, 
2008b). Ecotourism is defined as responsible travel to natural areas that conserves the 
environment and improves the well-being of local people (International Ecotourism 
Society 2008). Ecotourism is therefore culturally and environmentally sustainable and 
so minimizes adverse impacts, especially in the long term. Ecotourism helps in 
effective conservation of biodiversity-rich areas and improving livelihoods in poor 
indigenous communities by providing jobs, income and business opportunities to 
local communities.  
Many other market-based mechanisms to finance biodiversity have emerged, 
including bio-prospecting, certification schemes for sustainable practices, eco-
labeling for organic products and user fees. 
IUCN (2008b) describes the rationale for non-market based mechanisms as 
that biodiversity and ecosystem services have both public as well as private 
good/service characteristics, and that the market will fail to deliver on the value of 
public goods. Thus public investment (in the form of various taxes, funds and other 
measures) is required in order to finance conservation. 
The Global Environment Facility (GEF) provides grants to developing 
countries and countries with economies in transition for projects that achieve global 
environmental benefits in the area of biodiversity (GEF 2008). GEF funds are 
contributed by donor countries. In 2002, 32 donor countries pledged USD 3 billion 
to fund operations between 2002 and 2006 (IUCN 2008). GEF finances only the 
incremental cost of projects, which is the difference between the benefits that will 
accrue to the country, and the benefits to the world.  
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Debt-for-nature swaps are debt conversions which mean the cancellation of 
a country’s foreign debt in exchange for new obligations. A variety of debt 
conversion mechanisms exist, such as debt-for-equity, debt buy-backs, and debt-for-
nature swaps (Moye, 2001). Debt-forgiveness programs are also used in the USA 
(Defenders of Wildlife, 2006). 
Conservation trust funds or environmental funds include trust funds 
established by legislation, foundations, common-law trusts and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). Their aims range from financing the cost of protected areas 
(park funds), supporting national environmental plans or strategies (strategy funds), 
and providing grants for biodiversity conservation (grant funds) (Bayon, Lovink and 
Veening, 2000 as cited by IUCN, 2008b).  
Taxes are also used as economic instruments. These include income tax 
incentives, property tax incentives, estate tax incentives, capital gains tax. These taxes 
are usually enjoyed by landowners for conservation actions. IUCN (2008b) gives 
some examples of other taxes such as visitors to the Fernando de Noronha Marine 
National Park on the Atlantic coast of Brazil have to pay a daily environment tax that 
increases incrementally as the visit continues. The Caribbean island of Dominica 
levies USD 1.5 on all tourists on departure. Another example is the ecological value-
added tax in Brazil. This levy on the circulation of goods and services rewards 
municipalities for the positive externalities of their conservation areas, thus giving 
them an incentive to increase the area under conservation (Ibid.). 
Another instrument is compensation to communities for opportunity cost 
and damages or investments in livelihoods support activities. These stem from 
factors such as increasing demographic pressure, expansion of cultivation and the 
emergence of large-scale commercial farming. These are usually in terms of 
Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs). ICDPs aim at 
compensating people for the costs or providing alternative and/or complementary 
livelihoods activities. Thus they increase supply of ecosystem services by increasing 
supply of natural resources which would have been exploited from within protected 
areas or other conservation areas. 
 
3.2 A Demand and Supply Classification of Economic Instruments  
 
As explained earlier, biodiversity is viewed in economics as the source of 
biological resources which can be allocated by providing choices to improve human 
welfare. Therefore, the relationship between demand and supply underlies the forces 
that drive the allocation of natural resources from biodiversity. An evaluation of the 
success or failure of economic instruments for biodiversity would be to figure out 
whether they have addressed the demand and supply of resources they were aimed to 
address. I therefore classified the economic instruments by the demand and supply. 
This is an attempt to use the basics of economics to classify economic instruments 
for biodiversity conservation. Though the instruments affect both demand and 
supply of biological resources, the criteria is based which of these two factors are 
directly affected by the economic instrument. The specific determining criteria are 
that demand instruments directly decrease or increase demand for biological 
resources and the supply instruments directly increase or decrease supply of 
biological resources. The classification is presented in Table 3. 
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For example, ecotourism is a demand instrument.  Ecotourism in a forested 
area will reduce how the nearby communities which benefit from the tourism 
proceeds may demand biological resources such as timber and bushmeat from the 
forests.  Eco-labeling and certification also increases demand for products from 
sustainably managed resource bases.   
On the other hand, when there are tax incentives for landowners to keep 
biological resources on their land that directly reduces the supply of resources such 
as timber to the markets. Also, debt conversion mechanisms such as debt-for-nature 
swaps encourage poorer countries to protect their natural resources and this directly 
reduces the supply of biological resources from their natural areas. 
 
Demand instruments Supply instruments 
 Ecotourism 
 Markets for recreation 
 Eco-labeling and certification 
 User fees 
 Markets for carbon sequestration  
 Markets for watershed services 
 Compensation programs for 
opportunity cost and damages 
 
 Biodiversity offsets and mitigation 
 Conservation banking 
 Conservation easements 
 Covenants and deed restrictions 
 Stewardship exchange agreements 
 Mitigation banking 
 Transferable development rights 
 Tax cuts 
 Insurance 
 Cost-share incentives 
 Conservation stewardship incentives 
 Land and water rental leases 
 Conservation contracts 
 Property and estate tax incentives 
 Capital gains tax 
 Debt conversion mechanisms 
Table 3: A demand and supply classification of economic instruments. 
 
 
4. Experiences with the Use of Economic Instruments for 
Biodiversity Conservation 
 
Many experiences of the use of economic instruments for biodiversity 
conservation focus on their economic effectiveness and efficiency. Defenders of 
Wildlife (2006) state that from an economic perspective study of 1,250 land trusts in 
the USA (Parker, 2004), conservation easements have been one of the most cost 
effective incentives for conserving land. IUCN (2008b) explain that though the 
voluntary carbon markets are not doing much because of the increasing emissions, 
all countries stand to potentially gain from such trade. But the economic impacts on 
poor people in developing countries will depend on whether aforestation activities 
engage local communities, and whether they lead to loss of access to forest resources 
and fast-growing plantations that deplete groundwater supply. Also, there is little 
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evidence that mechanisms exist for and little reason to be confident that the benefits 
from credits will be transferred to communities and especially the poor.  
There are a few examples of positive social impacts from carbon markets. 
The Noel Kempff Mercado National Park is a partnership between the Government 
of Bolivia, various non-governmental organizations, American Electric Power, BP 
Amoco and PacifiCorp to protect four million acres of tropical forest. The primary 
purpose of the project is to capture carbon dioxide, but it also includes health care 
programs and alternative economic development activities to assist local people who 
live in and around the park and who depend on local resources for their livelihood. 
More than half the park rangers were hired from local communities. The project has 
resulted in formalized land tenure for the local communities. Another example is a 
community silviculture carbon offset project in the Sierra Norte of Oaxaca, Mexico, 
which finances the development of women’s groups (Ibid.).  In Ghana, United 
Nations Development Program/ Global Environment Facility (GEF) projects that 
have largely employed investments in alternative livelihoods activities resulted in 
about 2500 square kilometers (250,000 hectares) of land outside protected areas 
being placed under effective community management (GEF, 2008b). These examples 
show some of the positive effects of economic instruments used for biodiversity 
conservation. 
There are also negative impacts. The biggest social concerns from carbon 
projects are exclusion and erosion of rights, eviction, and the potential negative 
impacts of fast-growing plantations on soil, water and biodiversity. There is real 
potential for carbon projects to help poor people through new sources of income, 
diversified income streams, institutional development, and formalization of rights 
over resources. There are also real risks, however, of exclusion and increased 
vulnerability of the poor, and control of benefits by more powerful actors (GEF, 
2008b). 
In the USA, it is generally acknowledged that although there are many public 
and private incentive programs designed to encourage conservation, they tend to be 
overly specialized and prescriptive, fragmented and under-funded. These programs 
are also generally constrained by the fact that the primary threats to biodiversity – 
habitat loss, degradation and fragmentation – operate across public and private 
ownerships (Defenders of Wildlife 2006).  
According to the Regional Environmental Center (REC, 2008) of Central 
and Eastern Europe, as in many countries in that region, there is low efficiency on 
using economic instruments for conservation in Romania because of inadequate 
funding. Other reasons for the low efficiency of the economic instruments used in 
the past system include the following:  
 Deficiencies in the monitoring system, partly due to the lack of technical and 
material support, making it impossible to establish a link between the 
pollution and the polluter.  
 Socialist property generalization; the inappropriate use of economic 
instruments in environmental protection reduced the importance and 
character of those instruments;  
 Lack of priorities concerning environmental protection necessary for an 




The Forest Biodiversity Program for Southern Finland started in 2003 as a 
toolbox of several government-financed conservation programs (Mayer and Tikka 
2006). One tool, Natural Values Trading, is being actively tested. It involves 
contracts with private forests to conserve usually for 10 years. However there is not 
systematic monitoring. The mean value of incentive is US$1790 lump sum per 
hectare. 
In Sweden, Nature Conservation Agreements were started in 1995 (Mayer 
and Tikka 2006). The program is run as a contract between a landowner and Swedish 
Forest Agency to maintain or restore ecologically valuable forest habitats for a 
maximum of 50 years. This program is systematically monitored every four to five 
years. The mean value of incentive is US$1260 lump sum per hectare. 
The Indiana Classified Forest Program started in 1921 in Indiana, USA 
(Bennet et al. 1995). It uses property tax relief as an incentive to encourage forest 
owners to manage or restore forests. There is no fixed-term contract so landowners 
can withdraw but they have to pay the tax back with interest. It is monitored every 
five years. The mean value of the incentive is US$1300 per hectare per year in tax 
relief 
Two examples from Africa are the Selous Game Reserve, Tanzania 
(Gillingham and Lee 1999 as cited in Spiteri and Nepalz 2006); and Afadjato-
Agumatsa Community Forest, Ghana. In both examples there is high level of 
dependency on resources. In the Selous Game Reserve, incentives are in the form of 
support for livelihoods, promotion of agroforestry and plantation. The land is state-
owned but with traditional interests. The value of the incentive is $9.09 per hectare 
per year. In Afadjato, incentives are in the form of support for livelihoods, 
promotion of agro-forestry and benefit-sharing from ecotourism. The project started 
in 1999. The value of the incentive is $7/hectare per year. 
In Australia, (Australian Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage, 
2008) there is a government taxation concession in which the government providing 
a donor, who has donated a gift of $5,000 or more to an environment or heritage 
organisation, the opportunity to claim the donation against their tax returns over a 
five year period. 
In India, as in many parts of Asia, economic instruments were used for soil 
conservation. This conserves biodiversity in the soil as well as reduces the use of 
biodiversity-rich areas for agriculture. Incentives provided Include were input 
subsidies, distribution of tree seedlings, implements under subsidy, compensation for 
wages, investment in water harvesting structures (Reddy et al, 2004). 
An observation of the level of investments is that there has been a 
significantly lower dollar value of the incentives employed in developing countries. 
The examples in this paper do not represent the total figures from the regions. 
However, a computation of the figures from Finland, Sweden and the USA 
compared to those from Ghana and Tanzania gives a ratio of 181:1 in the dollar 
value of incentives employed per hectare of land being conserved for biodiversity. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
One obvious trend from this study is that there are a lot more supply 
instruments than demand instruments worldwide. This could be because of the need 
to increase supply of biological resources to satisfy human needs and wants. This is 
especially important because of the slower growth of natural resources compared to 
the demand for them by an increasing human population and other factors.  
Current research methodologies are biased because they fail to use controls, 
which would be required in an experiment. This is because the sites at which 
conservation programs are implemented are not selected randomly (Ferraro and 
Pattanayak (2006). I therefore suggest that future research in evaluating the 
effectiveness of economic instruments should use controls by using matching 
method which can account for observable correlated covariates. The results of this 
will present more objective evaluations of economic instruments used for 
biodiversity conservation. An example of the use of this is in Andam et al (2008). 
However, they studied the effectiveness of protected area networks and not 
economic instruments. 
Another issue for future research and conservation project implementation is 
the need to account for the value of the resources to be conserved before deciding 
the type and quantity of economic instruments to be used. This is not clear in 
current research and projects. An example is that GEF funds by policy are to pay for 
incremental costs, which is the difference between the benefits that accrue to the 
implementing country and benefits that accrue to the whole world. However no 
empirical valuation has been documented to be used to determine what the 
incremental cost will be. This process is even not accounted for in the in GEF’s 
project cycle policies and procedures (GEF, 2007). 
Generally, economic instruments being used for biodiversity conservation are 
serving good economic as well as conservation purposes. Based on current research, 
they contribute a lot to biodiversity conservation. They are, however, not panacea 
that can be used on their own and should therefore be used as complements and 
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